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Commissioner Elisse B. Walter
United States Securities and Exchange Commission
WELCOME

DEAN TREANOR: Hello, everyone. My name is Bill Treanor.
I'm delighted to welcome you to tonight's Sommer Lecture, where we'll
be hearing from Elisse Walter, Commissioner of the SEC.
In a few moments, Ben Indek, of the firm of Morgan, Lewis, which
makes possible this event, will be doing the introduction. But I have the
privilege of welcoming you and making a few introductory remarks.
The Sommer Lecture has a tradition of bringing to Fordham Law
School and the business community the insights of prominent policy-
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B. Walter delivered this address at Fordham University School of Law on
October 28, 2009. It has been edited to remove minor cadences of speech that appear
awkward in writing. For more information about the Fordham Corporate Law Center
please visit http://law.fordham.edu/corporate-law-center/corporatecenter.htm.
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makers and regulators. At the 2007 Sommer Lecture, SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins remarked: "The Sommer Lecture has become a
prominent feature in the ongoing dialogue among securities regulators,
practitioners, and the regulated community." That's fitting, given that
the lecture honors the legacy of former SEC Commissioner and former
securities law practitioner Al Sommer.
So we are just so, so, so delighted to be able to host this series that
honors Al, who was really such a great man.
We are honored to have Commissioner Walter deliver the Tenth
Annual Sommer Lecture. Past lectures have been by noted chief officers
of our financial regulatory organizations, including not only the SEC,
but the NASD, the New York Stock Exchange, and also the U.K.'s FSA.
Fordham Law has a great business law program, with outstanding
faculty who are leaders in their specialty areas, highly acclaimed for
their research and dedicated to their students and the craft of teaching.
We're joined here tonight by Professor Gus Katsoris, Professor Susan
Block-Lieb, Professor Martin Gelter, Professor Richard Squire,
Professor Rick Camell, Professor Steve Thel, and, from the college,
Professor Barbara Porco.
A round of applause for a talented faculty.
(Applause)
I would also like to recognize the Board of our Corporate Law
Center, which makes possible this event. Their vision and support have
allowed Fordham Law School to become a leader in the area of business
law. Up here tonight are our Chair and members of the Board of
Advisers: John Peloso, who is really the reason why we're all here, who
created the Corporate Center and really made this lecture a reality; Joe
Connors; Bob Hollweg; Pamela Chepiga; Howard Tuckman, from the
Business School; and Rick Ketchum.
In addition, we're joined by many of our alumni who are adjunct
professors and offer courses on the cutting edge of business law practice
today. That's one of the things that I think really separates Fordham
from other schools that are committed to business law, the fact that we
have so many top practitioners come in and teach our students about the
most pressing issues that they themselves are confronting. It's a great
gift for us.
We also have a number of distinguished past Sommer Lecturers in
the audience tonight: Margaret Cole, Director of Enforcement at the
FSA in the U.K. - I would just like to show that, as dean in my eighth
year, I've lost any sense of the passage of time. I was congratulating
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Director Cole on her lecture from last year, and she reminded me that it
was 2006. She's right. I checked it.
We're also joined by our 2004 lecturer, Rick Ketchum, the current
CEO of FINRA and also a member of our Corporate Center Board of
Advisers.
Members of the Sommer family who traveled here to join us
tonight: Mr. Sommer's wife Starr, their son Ed, who came here from
Chicago, their daughter Susie, their son-in-law Jeff Futter.
Your presence really means so much to us. The fact that you are
here every year is really - every year I look forward to your coming
back.
From the SEC, we have Matthew Daigler, who is Special Counsel
to the Commissioner. As she pointed out earlier, anything that is
positive you should give him credit for.
The Law School is so grateful for the partnership of the Morgan,
Lewis firm in presenting the Sommer Lecture Series. Ben Indek makes
it possible year after year. We'll be hearing from Ben in a moment.
Ben, we are so grateful for your leadership and making this possible.
I also want to acknowledge Anne Flannery, who is a partner in the
Washington, D.C., office, who helps us get such great speakers.
The support of the SEC Historical Society - here tonight is the
Chair of the Board of Trustees, James Barratt. The SEC Historical
Society, now in its tenth year, has a terrific virtual museum where
anyone can access timelines and photos from the SEC's past and download historical documents and speeches. One great example is the Oral
History Project. Very appropriately, Al Sommer gave one of the first
recorded oral interviews.
2009 is the seventy-fifth anniversary of the SEC. It has been a year
marked with celebrations, conferences, and a reaffirmation of the commitment by the SEC to continue to take action to protect the nation's
investors and ensure the integrity of the securities markets. It's very
appropriate that we have tonight's lecture in the seventy-fifth year of the
SEC's history.
Now I would like to thank the Corporate Law Center Dean's Fellow
Zachary Slates, a recent Fordham Law School graduate who has
provided invaluable assistance with tonight's lecture, and, finally, Ann
Rakoff, Director of the Corporate Center, who has just done the most
amazing job. Tonight, again, would not have happened but for her.
A big round of applause for everyone.
(Applause)
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Just a few final words. Fordham Law School is a school that takes
business law very, very, very seriously. One of the ways in which we
show our commitment to business law is through our Corporate Law
Center, which was created in 2001 and has really helped bring us even
greater stature in the field. The Center was formed in 2001 to serve as a
focal point for excellence and innovation in current and emerging issues
in business law and business. The Center seeks to be at the forefront of
identifying developing issues and proposing effective solutions. The
Center invites nationally and internationally recognized experts to
Fordham to offer their insights into and understanding of the complexities facing today's global business world.
The Corporate Law Center has developed an extraordinary
reputation through its public lectures, policy-related roundtables and
symposia, speakers and panels who represent leading members of the
bar, academia, regulatory agencies, and the judiciary. It really is
consistently a forum for cutting-edge discussion.
The Center is quite fortunate to work with and have the support of
members of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & FinancialLaw. We
actually recently did a search, and our corporate law journal is one of the
five most cited corporate law journals in the country. It has extraordinary influence. It was cited by the Supreme Court in 2005 in the
Arthur Andersen case.
Additional information about the Corporate Law Center and the
student-edited Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is
available on the registration tables in the atrium. If you would like
announcements of future programs, please stop at the registration table
and leave us your name and contact information.
2009 has been a banner year for the Corporate Law Center. Our
programs have attracted capacity audiences. Earlier in the month, we
had William Dudley, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. He gave a lecture, "A Bit Better, but Very Far from Best," which
got a lot of media coverage, including in the Times. On Wednesday,
December 2, the Corporate Center will be co-sponsoring with the Law
School's Intellectual Property Law Institute a panel discussion on the
pharmaceutical industry. We invite everyone to attend.
The Center values the interest and participation of all those
attending our events. We hope to see you at future events.
Without further ado, let me present Ben Indek, who will introduce
our speaker, Commissioner Walter. Ben?
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INTRODUCTION

MR. INDEK: On behalf of Morgan, Lewis, let me welcome you to
the Tenth Annual A.A. Sommer Lecture.
This year is particularly significant for us. Not only do we
celebrate a decade of Sommer Lectures, but 2009 also marks the thirtieth
anniversary of Morgan, Lewis's securities law practice. That practice
was started by Al Sommer, for whom Morgan, Lewis created this lecture
series.
Al was a Morgan, Lewis partner from 1979 until 1994. He then
became counsel to our firm. Al was a great public servant. To name
just two roles he played in the public sector, Al was an SEC
Commissioner from 1973 to 1976 and, later, Chairman of the Public
Oversight Board of the American Institute of CPAs.
In private practice, he was a trusted counselor, a well-known
author, and an expert commentator on a broad range of securities law
topics. He had particular expertise in corporate finance and accounting
issues.
When Al came to Morgan, Lewis 30 years ago, he brought with
him his own trusted lawyer - in fact, his legal counsel at the
Commission, Lloyd Feller. As always, Lloyd is with us here tonight,
and we appreciate that.
Together, Lloyd and Al created and expanded our securities
regulatory practice. Today we have more than 100 lawyers in six cities
around the country devoted to providing advice regarding the securities
laws to financial institutions and public companies. Our practice now
mirrors the structure of the SEC. We practice in the enforcement and
litigation, trading and markets, investment management, and corporate
finance areas.
Al was an enthusiastic participant in the first two lectures we held
at Fordham Law School. Sadly, he passed away in 2002. We're delighted that his family continues its close relationships with our firm.
When Elisse became SEC Commissioner last year, Starr sent me a
handwritten note saying that she and Al got to know Elisse when he
served on the NASD Board of Governors and she worked on the staff.
Starr told me that she even hoped that someday Elisse could deliver this
lecture. As you will all see in a moment, Starr's wish has come true.
A couple of other notes. Dean Treanor mentioned both Margaret
Cole and Rick Ketchum here, past speakers. Linda Thompson also
sneaked in. She was a super pinch-hitter last year, in this baseball

552

FORDHAMJOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XV

season. We very much appreciate what you did for us last year, Linda.
Thank you very much.
(Applause)
I would like to turn to tonight's speaker. Perhaps even more than
Al, Elisse Walter has dedicated her career to public service. The short
version is this (the longer one is in your brochure): After a stint in
private practice, in 1977 Elisse joined the SEC, where she served for
seventeen years. She then served as General Counsel of the CFTC and
in senior positions at NASD and FINRA. Elisse was appointed to her
current position, SEC Commissioner, in July of 2008.
She has won many awards during her career, including several at
the SEC.
Put simply, Elisse has played an enormous role in shaping the
nation's securities laws and regulations, and continues to do so today.
In preparing for tonight, I reviewed a number of Al's speeches from
his tenure on the Commission. I also looked at several that Elisse has
given in her role as SEC Commissioner and gave some thought to the
current and pressing issues confronting today's SEC. I was struck by
the fact that although more than thirty years separate their service on the
Commission, Al and Elisse were, and are, confronted with some of the
same issues.
For example, in 1974, Al spoke about corporate disclosure. Almost
exactly thirty-five years later, Elisse delivered a lecture at the annual
Corporate Counsel Institute where, among other topics, she tackled
proxy enhancements and risk disclosures. The list goes on. In fact, I
have it on pretty good authority that Elisse will hark back to some of
Al's 1976 speeches when she takes the stage in a few moments.
What really stood out were not necessarily the day-to-day issues
faced by regulators and the regulated, then and now, but the fact that,
despite decades having passed, some of the really large, I would say
game-changing issues that confronted Al in the 1970s are back again to
face Elisse now. Back then the securities industry was dealing with
fixed commissions and the development of a central market system. Al
gave a talk called "The SEC in the Midst of Revolution." In today's
post-meltdown world, Elisse could use the same title and talk about the
current issues embroiling the SEC now.
Here's another. In 1975, Al delivered a lecture with the title "Can
the SEC Help the Capital Crunch?" and another that same year, "The
Delicate Balance of Regulation and Competition." How about this one,
from May 1975, when Al said - and I'm quoting here - "Many were
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convinced that we were at or near the bottom of the country's present
economic miseries"? Al's title for that speech was a simple but
profound question: "Have We Learned Anything?" In his remarks, Al
stated - and I'm quoting again - "We should reflect on what we have
gone through, what brought us here, and what must be done in the future
to make our system work better than it did in the past."
Revolutionary transformation of the securities industry, capital
crunch, regulatory change, lessons to be learned from the crisis - aren't
those the same big-picture issues that Elisse and her colleagues on the
Commission face in 2009?
It seems trite to rely on the old adage that the more things change,
the more they stay the same. But it really does ring true. I wish that Al
could be here tonight to hear Elisse's views on the challenges she and
the SEC face. He could have given her some tips because he dealt with
some of the same issues.
We are proud of Al Sommer's affiliation with Morgan, Lewis and
delighted to sponsor this annual lecture in his honor. I'm pleased to turn
the podium over to our speaker tonight, SEC Commissioner Elisse
Walter.
(Applause)
LECTURE

COMMISSIONER WALTER: Thank you, Ben, for that lovely
introduction. And thank you also, Dean Treanor, for inviting me. I am
delighted to be here at Fordham University, with the members of your
Law School community, alumni, honored guests, and the many, many
friends I see here tonight.
It's particularly an honor to have been asked to give the Tenth
Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr., Lecture on Corporate, Securities, and
Financial Law. Particularly since I was unable to join you for the Ninth,
this Tenth is very special to me. And I, too, would like to thank Linda
Thompson for not only doing yeoman's service, but for giving a speech
that I'm sure will far outshine what I do tonight.
As you know, Al Sommer made extraordinary contributions to the
federal securities laws. In his many different roles in public service, he
set a sterling example for all public servants.
I had the distinct pleasure, as Ben noted, of working with Al when I
was with NASD. To sum up that experience, I would simply say that
the reality of Al lived up to his illustrious reputation, but with a warmth
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and sense of humor that the reputation could not duplicate. I like to
flatter myself by thinking that, in some small way, I can walk in his
footsteps.
While working with Al, I also got the opportunity, as was also
noted, to get to know Starr. She is an extraordinary woman - and I
hope I continue to look nearly half as good as she looks tonight - and I
am extremely pleased that she and her family are with us this evening.
Before I get too much further, I have to remind you that the
following remarks represent my own views, and not necessarily those of
the Commission, my fellow Commissioners, or members of the staff.
Atypically, I would also like to let you know that in the interest of time
and your continued friendship, my remarks tonight will be shorter than
the version of the speech that will be posted on the SEC's Website.
Matt Daigler and I have spent the last four or five days cutting and
cutting and cutting. But we're not going to let it go to waste. It will be
out there somewhere.
Tonight, I would like to talk about another topic that was important
to Al - the municipal securities market. It is quite fitting that I address
this topic here in New York because, as I am sure many of you are
aware, the New York City financial crisis in 1975 was one of the major
catalysts for change in municipal disclosure practices. And, for me, it's a
return to a subject near and dear to my heart: The last major project I
worked on before leaving the Commission staff in 1994 was municipal
disclosure.
The recent financial crisis has revealed many gaps and weaknesses
in the existing regulatory framework and has led to calls for, among
other things, a systemic regulator, regulation of hedge funds, and
regulation of over-the-counter derivatives. This push for regulatory
reform is certainly understandable. As Al rightly noted more than thirty
years ago, "Most reform in society seems to come about as the
consequence of crisis or a catastrophe or a dramatic event which points
up the existence of a problem." Perhaps less elegantly, but more
recently and more colorfully, Rahm Emanuel said, "Never let a serious
crisis go to waste."
What is far less understandable to me, however, is the relative lack
of attention being given to the municipal securities market. SEC
Chairmen ranging from David Ruder and Arthur Levitt to Christopher
Cox and Mary Schapiro have advocated taking a hard look at this area.
But this topic has not received serious consideration in recent regulatory
reform discussions. And yet this market is enormous and operates with
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increasing participation by retail investors. Municipal securities are
securitized, and both large and small municipalities use complex
structured products and financial derivatives whose risks even
sophisticated investors sometimes have trouble understanding. As
Arthur Levitt put it this past summer: "Our nation's leaders risk committing a major error if they don't carefully consider the workings of the
municipal-bond market. The opacity of this market is unrivaled and thus
represents a significant threat to our economy."
What I will say tonight is not necessarily new. These are not new
ideas. In fact, many of them have been floating around for years. You
can even find some of them in a speech Al gave back in 1976, when he
was an SEC Commissioner. But in my mind, these are ideas whose time
definitely has come, particularly while the window of opportunity for
effecting real regulatory change is still open.
Let me start with a little background.
As recently as the early 1970s, the municipal securities market was
still relatively small. There were about $25 billion to $49 billion of
bonds outstanding in 1975, and the market attracted very little attention.
The standard issue was usually a general obligation bond, with fairly
standard features. Interest rates were stable. Generally, the only purchasers were wealthy investors, banks, and insurance companies.
Disclosure was minimal or sometimes even nonexistent.
In stark contrast, the current amount of municipal bonds
outstanding is estimated to be nearly $2.8 trillion, and more than $390
billion of new bonds and notes were issued last year. Since the Build
America Bonds program began in April of this year, states and localities
have issued more than $35 billion of what are affectionately known as
BAB bonds. Despite its reputation as a buy-and-hold market, trading
volume is also substantial, with almost $5.5 trillion of long and shortterm municipal securities traded in 2008 in nearly $11 million
transactions.
With nearly 50,000 issuers at the state and local level, it is an
extremely diverse market as well. The typical municipal bond investor
has changed, too. Individual investors hold approximately 36 percent of
outstanding municipal securities directly and up to another 36 percent
indirectly through mutual funds and closed-end funds. And, in spite of
their reputation for safety, municipal securities can and do default.
Since 1999, issuers have defaulted on over $24 billion in municipal
bonds out of a total of $3.4 trillion issued. In 2008 alone, 140 municipal
issuers defaulted on almost $8 billion in bonds.
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In sum, the municipal securities market today bears no resemblance
to what former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox called "the relatively
small and sleepy municipal bond activity of days gone by."
Despite its size and obvious importance, however, the municipal
securities market, unfortunately, lacks many of the protections
customary in many other sectors of the U.S. capital markets. Investors
in municipal securities are, in certain respects, afforded second-class
treatment under current law or treated as second-class citizens.
Let me briefly outline the current disclosure requirements for
municipal issuers, with apologies to most of you and permission for a
short nap for the many for whom this background is unnecessary. I
promise to be short.
Congress exempted offerings of municipal securities from the
registration requirements and civil liability provisions of the Securities
Act and the system of periodic reporting under the Exchange Act. The
Commission is prohibited from imposing mandatory disclosure
obligations on municipal issuers or mandating that they use generally
accepted governmental accounting standards. We can, however, bring
enforcement actions against any person or entity, including municipal
issuers, who violate the antifraud provisions.
As part of the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Congress
established a very limited regulatory scheme for municipal securities
intermediaries. This included mandatory registration of municipal securities brokers and dealers and the creation of the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, or MSRB. Federal regulatory authority over issuers
of municipal securities, however, was specifically limited by the
provision commonly known as the Tower Amendment, which prohibits
the Commission and the MSRB from requiring any issuer of municipal
securities to make any filings with the Commission or the MSRB prior
to the sale of securities.
In 1989, in response to consistently slow dissemination of information in connection with primary offerings of "munis," the Commission adopted Rule 15c2-12, which requires underwriters in munis
offerings of $1million or more to get, review, and distribute to investors
copies of the issuer's disclosure documents.
Under Chairman Levitt's leadership, in 1994 the Commission
adopted amendments to that rule to enhance the quality, timing, and
dissemination of disclosure in the secondary municipal securities
market. Among other things, these amendments prohibit an underwriter
from participating in a muni offering unless it has reasonably determined
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that the issuer has undertaken to provide specified annual information
and event notices to information repositories. In the same year, the
Commission also issued interpretive guidance concerning the disclosure
obligations of muni bond market participants under the antifraud
provisions.
Since that time, the Commission has adopted further amendments
to the rule to provide for a single centralized repository, the MSRB, for
the electronic collection and availability of information about outstanding municipal securities in the secondary market. The system is
known as EMMA, and EMMA should help provide ready and prompt
access to continuing disclosure documents to investors and help fulfill
the regulatory and information needs of muni market participants.
Finally -

and the history is nearly over -

this past summer, the

Commission proposed additional amendments to the rule that would
impose further requirements on broker-dealers and municipal securities
dealers with respect to the disclosure of specified events by issuers or
their obligated persons. In addition, the MSRB filed a rule proposal
with the Commission that would permit issuers and their agents to make
certain voluntary submissions to EMMA.
Now let's take a look. We have a regulatory system that exempts
municipal securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Are these
exemptions of continuing legitimacy? I don't think so.
There are three reasons that are typically given for affording special
treatment to municipal securities.
Regarding the first rationale, which is the perceived lack of abuses
in the municipal markets, the Commission has brought dozens of
enforcement cases in recent years that highlight the continuing disclosure weaknesses in that market and raise concerns about governmental accounting. These actions involved a wide range of disclosure
violations.
Also, as I mentioned earlier, municipalities can and do default on
their bonds. Perhaps the most notorious example is bonds of the
Washington Public Power Supply System, or WPPSS, followed closely
by Orange County, California, the largest municipal bankruptcy in
American history. We are still waiting to see what happens to Jefferson
County, Alabama, which is contemplating filing for bankruptcy
protection to address its debt problems.
Finally, there have been numerous bid-rigging, price-fixing, pay-toplay, and other scandals in the market. There have also been a number
of instances of abusive practices by financial advisers, who are largely
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unregulated by the Commission.
So I don't think that rationale holds water any longer.
The second rationale for exempting municipal securities - namely,
that it is a sophisticated institutional market - is clearly no longer valid
today. The extensive retail participation in the municipal market I
mentioned earlier is probably only going to increase as baby boomer
senior investors like me increasingly include fixed-income and tax-free
offerings in their retirement portfolios.
The third rationale is the most important. It is intergovernmental
comity. That is more difficult to dismiss. I should begin by noting that
this really isn't a federalism issue under the U.S. Constitution. Rather,
intergovernmental comity is a matter of balancing the respect due to the
local interests of municipalities and their citizens, on the one hand, and
the federal interest in maintaining the integrity of the national market
system for the benefit of investors, on the other.
This simple contrast between state and local interests and federal
interests is a bit misleading, however, when you consider that
municipalities are populated by taxpayers who also are frequently
investors, perhaps even in the bonds issued by those same
municipalities. Indeed, the concerns of a citizen qua taxpayer and the
same citizen qua investor have something very important in common.
Just as an investor wants to understand the true financial health of an
entity whose debt it purchases, a taxpayer has an interest in understanding the true fiscal health of the state or local municipality in which
he or she lives. So the call for greater federal regulation of the municipal securities market could have benefits for both taxpayers and
investors alike.
Now that I have addressed briefly why the old arguments for
exempting municipal securities from the federal securities laws are no
longer compelling, let me provide some reasons in support of removing
the exemptions.
First, the markets have changed. Municipal securities offerings are
not a local affair any longer; they are national. Investors around the
country buy bonds from states like New York and California. As the
municipal market becomes more diffuse, the patchwork of state
regulation makes less and less sense. Without uniformity of standards, it
will be difficult for investors to fully appreciate and compare the relative
risks associated with different investment products. This can lead to an
inefficient allocation of capital resources.
Second, in the last two decades, the municipal market experienced
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the same proliferation of innovation and financial engineering as the rest
of the world's capital markets. Municipalities frequently engage in
complex derivative transactions, and their products are then securitized.
While the largely unregulated nature of this market has been a problem
for a long time, it only threatens to get worse as municipalities look for
creative ways to manage budget shortfalls.
Third, markets have become increasingly interconnected. Consider
that many mutual funds today hold municipal securities, and now there
are even exchange-traded funds that hold municipal securities. But
perhaps the best example of how the municipal securities market is
interconnected with other markets is the liquidity crisis in auction rate
securities caused by increasing subprime mortgage defaults and the
resulting dramatic reduction in the value of many collateralized
mortgage obligations.
The extent to which municipal securities should be regulated by the
federal government comes down to a policy decision. While we have to
make proper allowances for the unique characteristics of municipal
issuers, I believe strongly that we do not have to tolerate muni investors
being treated like second-class citizens. Investors deserve the same
level of high-quality disclosure and protection in the municipal market
as they currently get in the corporate market, and they should not have to
be forced to rely on good-faith voluntary disclosure.
How should the municipal securities market be reformed?
Under the Commission's current authority, our options seem to be
limited. With the most recent proposals, we may have pushed Rule
15c2-12 about as far as we can, although I would be open to any ideas
you have about how the Commission could do more with the rule.
Absent legislation, however, I believe there are still some things that the
Commission could and should do under its current authority.
First, I believe the Commission should further leverage its existing
antifraud authority over municipal issuers to try to improve the quality
and timeliness of disclosures. Various groups have published voluntary
But voluntary
disclosure guidelines and industry best practices.
disclosure has its limitations, and I believe that the Commission needs to
send a stronger signal to the municipal issuer community regarding their
obligations to provide full and fair disclosure.
After fifteen years and dozens of enforcement actions, I believe it is
time to update the 1994 Interpretive Guidance on the Antifraud
Provisions. By making the obligations of municipal issuers more
explicit, the Commission could help ensure that disclosure is as
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complete, timely, and accessible as possible. For example, recent
studies have indicated that many municipal issuers are woefully tardy in
issuing their annual financial statements, and yet many of these
municipalities continue to issue bonds in the market. But issuing
securities based on out-of-date financials may violate the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws if material changes have
occurred in an issuer's financial condition since its last financial
statements were issued.
Second, I would like to see the Commission continue to work
closely with the MSRB to further enhance the usefulness of EMMA.
The MSRB has started this initiative well, and I think the Commission
should support this effort strongly.
Finally, I believe that regulators and the industry should work more
closely together to provide pre-trade transparency in this market. Why
shouldn't there be better information about potential buyers and sellers?
But as important as these regulatory and industry steps might be,
municipal securities disclosure issues can only be addressed adequately
through authority that federal securities regulators do not now possess.
Therefore, to fully reform the regulation of the municipal securities
market, I believe congressional action is necessary in a number of areas.
First, I believe that some changes need to be made to the MSRB.
To begin with, it should have a majority public board.
Also, currently the MSRB does not enforce the rules it sets.
Instead, FINRA, the Commission, and in some cases other appropriate
regulatory agencies enforce the MSRB's rules.
Separating the
regulatory function from the enforcement and examination functions can
lead to coordination and communication problems. For this reason, I
believe that Congress should seriously consider whether to combine the
enforcement and regulatory authority over the municipal market into one
self-regulatory organization.
Next, I believe that Congress should permit the Commission to
apply to nongovernmental conduit borrowers the registration and
disclosure standards that would apply if they issued their securities
directly without using municipal issuers as conduits. This is something
the Commission has long advocated, and I fully support the recommendation. The fact that the bonds are tax-exempt does not change the
fact that these are private obligations in which investors look to a private
entity for repayment.
I also believe that the Commission should have regulatory authority
over all financial intermediaries involved in the municipal securities

2010

A. A. SOMMER LECTURE: ELISSE WALTER

market. The observed and reported misconduct of some municipal
financial advisers is alarming. Here I am thinking of pay-to-play
practices, undisclosed conflicts of interest, advice rendered by financial
advisers without adequate training or qualifications, and failure to place
the duty of loyalty to their clients ahead of their own interests.
In addition, as politically unpopular as this suggestion may be, I
believe that the exemptions for municipal securities should be removed
from the 1933 and 1934 Acts and that the Tower Amendment should be
repealed.
Let me say immediately that I fully appreciate that deference should
be shown to the special questions concerning disclosure and accounting
that municipal issuers present. Municipal securities should not be
treated exactly like corporate securities. Municipal disclosure serves a
dual purpose. It both reports on the financial state of a municipal
securities issuer and it tells citizens about how the municipality spends
their hard-earned tax dollars. There is nothing quite like this in the corporate space. Moreover, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach to
municipal disclosure, given the wide range of purposes and structures of
the over 50,000 issuers in this market.
Nonetheless, appropriate legislative change would allow the
Commission to take important steps to improve the quality and availability of municipal information to investors.
First, the Commission could require that municipal issuers make
available to investors offering documents and periodic reports that contain information that is similar, although not exactly identical, to that
required of issuers and offerings of corporate securities. Municipal
issuers should not necessarily be required to receive pre-approval of
offerings from the Commission. To me, what is most important is the
integrity of the continuing disclosure obligations of issuers, not whether
they receive pre-approval from the Commission before issuing a bond.
Complete, timely, and accurate disclosure is essential for the proper
functioning of the municipal securities markets - in particular, for
efficient pricing.
Timeliness is a particular concern. With the appropriate authority,
the Commission could mandate that municipal disclosures be issued in a
time period that would make critical information available when
investment decisions are made, not many months thereafter.
Of course, municipal issuers, like corporate issuers, should have an
alternative to the registered public offering. With new authority, the
Commission could engage in tailored rulemaking that would provide
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appropriate exemptions, for example, for small issuances and private
placements, just as currently exist for corporate securities offerings.
One possibility worth considering is a tranched approach to issuer
obligations. The largest issuers could be required to provide disclosures
similar to public companies, while smaller issuers would be subject to a
less rigorous disclosure regime.
Second, legislation could give the Commission the authority to
mandate that municipal issuers use generally accepted governmental
accounting standards. In some states, deviation from accounting standards set by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, or GASB,
is required by state law, and the situation seems to only be getting
worse. Comparability of investment opportunities is critical, and today
the only real way to compare municipal investments is by yield and
ratings. That is not sufficient. Lack of uniform accounting standards
makes financial statements hard to understand and difficult to compare,
particularly for less sophisticated investors.
As part of this accounting reform, I believe that Congress should
provide an independent funding mechanism for the GASB and permit
Commission oversight of that body, as is now provided by the SarbanesOxley Act for the Financial Accounting Standards Board, or FASB.
Currently, GASB is funded by voluntary payments and contributions
from states and local governments and the financial community, as well
as sales of its publications. This funding mechanism simply is not
adequate to ensure that the board is a truly independent standard setter.
Finally, I would like close with an observation on the recent
discussion of mandating that credit rating agencies use a single scale for
rating corporate and municipal bonds. I certainly support efforts to
make the ratings of bonds more fair and accurate. In some ways, a
single scale makes sense, given that corporate and municipal markets are
increasingly interconnected. However, we do not want to lose the level
of granularity that currently exists within the rating scale for municipal
securities. At a minimum, though, if municipal issuers want to have
their bonds rated on the same scale as corporate bonds, I believe they
should be prepared to provide the same level of timely and accurate
disclosure as corporate issuers. Investors deserve no less.
As I end my remarks, I think it would be fitting to quote Al one last
time. He said, "Out of every crisis there emerges change, and in most,
perhaps not all, cases, a change that serves the public good." I hope that
our experience with reform of the municipal securities market will be
another instance of what Al called, "crisis fostering constructive
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change."
I thank you very much for having me here this evening. I'd be
happy to answer your questions.
(Applause)
MR. INDEK: We'll take a couple of questions and then we'll invite everybody to have a drink, including Elisse, outside.
QUESTION: Being an ex-Federal Reserve examiner, we were
mandated to ensure the safety and soundness of the institutions down to
the depositor. My dealings on the securities side are - if you are
ensuring the interest of the investors, I don't see presently how FINRA
or SEC is ensuring the safety and soundness of the institutions that the
people are investing in. Do you see them moving more in that direction,
to have more oversight?
The second part of the question is, what about accountability of the
examiners, the supervisor of enforcement when things are missed?
COMMISSIONER WALTER: Let me start with the first. The first
really harks back to an age-old debate - or at least going back well
beyond my years to when the securities laws were enacted in the 1930s
- and that is what I think is a healthy tension between the banking laws
and the securities laws. As you noted, the banking laws have as their
focus the safety and soundness of the banking institutions and today,
more broadly, the safety and soundness of the system. The securities
laws, of course, don't ignore either of those things, particularly with
respect to entities we actually regulate - not corporate issuers, not
municipal issuers, but broker-dealers, investment advisers. But the
primary thrust of the federal securities laws is the protection of investors
and the integrity of the markets.
So they are very different statutory schemes. They have been
charged, perhaps wisely, to different bodies. That tension has been a
healthy tension over many decades. So I don't see the SEC shifting
more to being a safety and soundness institution. I think that the SEC
will continue to be what we like to call the investor's advocate and to
look at things through investors' eyes.
That said, it, of course, doesn't serve investors well to see their
investments go down the tubes. But our first focus is not whether an
issuer goes into bankruptcy -if that happens, that happens - but to try
to preserve as much as possible for the investors in that entity.
Your second question related to the accountability of inspectors,
examiners, enforcement folks, policymakers, and commissioners, when
things go badly. I think we are accountable. I think we should be
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accountable. I think there is enough blame in the current market crisis
- or perhaps the evolving away from market crisis - to go around. I
think we take our share of it. I do think that it is not appropriate to shift
all blame to regulators when things go wrong. There is a tendency to do
that at times. But I do think, particularly in this past financial crisis, the
one we're living through right now, that there were clearly mistakes that
regulators, including the SEC, made. It is-our job to try to rectify the
consequences of that to the extent we can and to ensure that we don't
make the same mistake again - which will, of course, never be a
guarantee that we won't make a different mistake the next time. But we
have to try.
QUESTION: Can you comment on the progress or potential timetable that the Commission will be taking with regard to the International
Financial Reporting Standards?
COMMISSIONER WALTER: The question was on our potential
timetable with respect to - I assume you're talking about international
accounting standards, IFRS.
As many of you probably know, the Commission late last year put
out a roadmap with respect to potential adoption of IFRS for U.S.
issuers. We plan to make another issuance on that subject before the end
of this year.
As you may also know, since you seem to be familiar with the
topic, there is an active convergence project going on between the FASB
and the International Accounting Standards Board. That is one of the
prerequisites, I believe, for the U.S. to move in that direction.
We are clearly, at the Commission, I believe, prepared to do that, if
and when we determine that that is the best thing for U.S. investors. But
it is moving forward and we are committed to moving forward with it.
QUESTION: Can you comment on the feasibility or desirability of
increased regulatory authority of the SEC over the rating agencies, on
whom the average investor relies?
COMMISSIONER WALTER: We're trying to do two things in
that area - or actually three things.
The first is to educate. One of the problems here is that people
don't understand what ratings do and what they don't do.
Second is to take steps, along with others, to decrease reliance on
ratings and to provide other accessible and understandable information
to investors.
Third is to use the authority we have recently been granted to
regulate rating agencies. As you probably know, that authority is
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circumscribed. We are not entitled to interfere or to set rating agency
methodology. I don't particularly think that's a flaw in the statutory
structure, because I don't believe that we have the expertise or will have
the expertise to do that. But we are currently inspecting credit rating
agencies. We have passed a number of rules to impose greater strictures
on how they behave, and there are a number of rules that are also
outstanding.
That, of course, is going on around the world. One of the most
important aspects of this is, because we live in a global world with
global markets, there has to also be some degree of consistency as you
go across lines in this particular area.
QUESTION: What have you learned from Madoff?
COMMISSIONER WALTER: As I said, I think we learn from our
mistakes, in terms of the mistakes we made with respect to Bernie
Madoff. And there were many people who made mistakes, but the SEC
was certainly among them. He would not be in that position again,
because that lesson we clearly learned.
The question is whether we have learned more broadly to the next
person who is going to be like that, who is going to take advantage of
people in a somewhat different way.
I think what we should learn, all of us, is that healthy skepticism
should be the norm. You look at many of the investors in Madoff who
didn't ask questions. You look at the regulators who didn't ask enough
questions.
I hope that we have learned on a number of different levels, in both
very simple ways, as I suggested, and much more complicated ways,
that we need to both close regulatory holes, do a better job examining
people, and also take better care of our own money and be careful about
whom we rely on in terms of making investments.
QUESTION: Are municipal pension liabilities currently shown on
municipal balance sheets?
COMMISSIONER WALTER: There's a question that I don't
really know the answer to. Some of them are and some of them are not,
I believe. That's a very important question, but rather a technical one,
and although I confess to being a math major and I aspired to being an
accountant, I am not one. But I can certainly find out the answer to that
question for you if you want to give me a call next week. I will give you
a very complicated answer to a simple question.
MR. INDEK: Thank you all. I invite everybody out for a drink. If
everybody wants to get home for the first pitch tonight, you need to step
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outside.
(Applause)
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